MOGADISHU (Somaliguardian) – Reports of alleged Qatar-brokered talks between Al-Shabaab and Somalia’s federal government have circulated in recent days. None of the parties named – Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab, or Doha – have confirmed or denied them.
The claims were amplified by Somali journalist Abdalla Ahmed Mumin, founder of the Somali Journalists Syndicate (SJS), who later reported that the supposed contacts had collapsed. Similar unverified accounts of “secret negotiations” have appeared in past political cycles and were later dismissed as fabrications or smear campaigns.
While the authenticity of the latest claims remains unclear, analysts argue that genuine, successful talks between the two sides are not feasible in the current political and military climate. Their reasoning is rooted in two decades of conflict, the actors’ stated positions, and the regional and international constraints shaping Somalia’s war with Al-Shabaab.
A Conflict Defined by Maximalist Demands
Al-Shabaab has fought successive Somali governments for nearly two decades, with both sides suffering heavy losses and tens of thousands of civilians killed.
The group’s origins trace back to 2006, when it served as the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The ICU briefly controlled most of southern Somalia before a large Ethiopian military intervention – backed by the United States – forced it from power.
Before that intervention, the ICU had insisted on two non-negotiable demands:
- Withdrawal of all foreign troops, particularly Ethiopian forces; and
- Governance under Sharia law.
Those demands remain central to Al-Shabaab’s ideology today and have consistently derailed attempts at accommodation.
In 2008, moderate ICU figures, led by Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, signed a peace agreement with the TFG that paved the way for Ethiopia’s withdrawal and a power-sharing arrangement. Sharif was later elected president.
Al-Shabaab rejected his government, arguing it refused to rule by Sharia and remained dependent on foreign troops – then the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Fighting intensified, with insurgents at one point reaching within metres of the presidential palace before being pushed back by AU forces.
By late 2011, Al-Shabaab withdrew from Mogadishu and shifted to guerrilla tactics designed to stretch AU troops, trigger donor fatigue and prepare for a long-term attempt to regain national power.
Is Al-Shabaab Open to Talks?
Publicly, Al-Shabaab maintains that it will not negotiate with Somalia’s federal government, which it describes as an “apostate” authority backed by the West. Senior figures insist Mogadishu lacks power to enforce any agreement.
Some analysts argue the group might be willing to consider talks in principle – but only with the United States, whom it sees as the decisive external actor in Somalia. Washington has long opposed direct engagement with the group, which is designated as a foreign terrorist organisation by the US, UN and many other governments.
While Al-Shabaab has privately negotiated hostage releases with foreign states, these transactions have never amounted to political dialogue.
Is Mogadishu Positioned for Negotiations?
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has repeatedly said his government could one day engage in talks with Al-Shabaab, but only “from a position of strength”.
The government, however, has suffered significant military setbacks in recent months. A major offensive launched in 2022 has largely stalled, with militants regaining territory and federal forces struggling to consolidate earlier gains.
Politically, Mogadishu is locked in disputes with several federal member states – including Puntland and Jubaland – over electoral preparations and constitutional reforms. The government’s mandate is also approaching its end, further constraining its leverage.
Under such conditions, Somali officials lack the internal unity and military advantage required for meaningful negotiations.
Could Qatar Broker Talks Without US Backing?
Qatar has played major roles in high-profile mediations, from Afghanistan to Gaza, but those efforts enjoyed strong US engagement.
Diplomats and regional observers say Doha would be unable to broker a Somalia deal without American support, as well as coordination with neighbouring states such as Kenya and Ethiopia – both of which view Al-Shabaab as a direct security threat and are deeply wary of any process that might strengthen the group politically.
Claims that Qatar is acting unilaterally are widely regarded by specialists as implausible.
Obstacles to Any Negotiated Settlement
A series of substantial hurdles would complicate even preliminary talks:
1. Deep-seated political divisions within Somalia
Federal member states, notably Puntland, Jubaland and the self-declared republic of Somaliland, would strongly oppose any exclusive talks led by Mogadishu. They often accuse the central government of appeasing or enabling militants – accusations federal authorities reject.
2. Strong resistance from regional powers
Kenya and Ethiopia both oppose any outcome that could enable an Islamist administration in Mogadishu. Ethiopia and Kenya also fear Al-Shabaab’s territorial claims spill across their borders.
3. Al-Shabaab’s core demands
The group continues to demand:
- Withdrawal of all foreign troops, including African Union peacekeepers; and
- Rule under Islamic law across Somalia.
International partners, particularly the United States, consider a complete troop withdrawal unacceptable due to security risks. These positions create an immediate diplomatic deadlock.
4. Al-Shabaab’s affiliation with Al-Qaeda
Although analysts note the group could theoretically renounce the global network, breaking formal ties would not address its ideological goals or territorial ambitions. Most experts agree Al-Shabaab seeks an “Afghanistan-style” victory rather than power-sharing.
Lessons from Afghanistan and Syria — But Not Replicable in Somalia
Al-Shabaab closely observed the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan and the evolution of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria. But the Somali context differs sharply.
Afghanistan’s Taliban gained control after a US-negotiated withdrawal and the collapse of Afghan government forces. No regional power openly opposed the Taliban’s takeover of power.
HTS in northwest Syria gained leverage partly through covert engagement with foreign powers and a willingness to compromise on ideology.
In Somalia, by contrast, no neighbouring country supports an Al-Shabaab takeover, and Ethiopia and Kenya maintain significant military presence in areas bordering their territory.
A Conflict Set to Continue
In recent months, Al-Shabaab has increased its presence around the outskirts of Mogadishu, establishing temporary checkpoints on key approach roads. The moves reflect both the group’s confidence and the government’s overstretched security apparatus.
But despite occasional speculation about a negotiated pathway out of conflict, both sides appear committed to a military approach.
For Al-Shabaab, talks risk internal division without delivering its ultimate objective: a full Islamic emirate.
For the government, negotiations – especially amid political turmoil – could weaken its legitimacy and fuel accusations from rival states and internal critics.
For now, Somalia’s long war appears set to grind on, with neither side positioned to seek, accept or implement a political settlement.
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